The goal of this piece is to put some pressure on Brian O’Shaughnessy’s claim that perceptual experiences are necessarily mental processes. The author targets two motivations behind the development of that view. First, O’Shaughnessy resorts to pure conceptual analysis to argue that perceptual experiences are processes. The author argues that this line of reasoning is inconclusive. Secondly, he repeatedly invokes a thought experiment concerning the total freeze of a subject’s experiential life. Even if this case is coherent, however, it does (...) not show that perceptual experiences are processes. (shrink)

A number of contemporary philosophers of mind have brought considerations from the study of aspect to bear on the ontological question how perceptual experiences persist over time. But, apart from rare exceptions, relatively little attention has been devoted to assess whether the way we talk about perceptual occurrences is of any relevance for discussions of ontological matters in general, let alone discussions about the ontological nature of perception. This piece examines whether considerations derived from the study of lexical aspect have (...) a significant bearing on what ontological views of perception we should endorse: I shall argue that such aspectual considerations are in fact of very little use for settling the relevant ontological issue. (shrink)

This piece contrasts two ontological views of perceptual experience: on the one hand, Experiential Heracliteanism, a view according to which the intuitively dynamic character of experience should be described – and probably accounted for – in irreducibly dynamic terms; and, on the other, Experiential non‐Heracliteanism, a stance according to which perceptual experience may at least be described – if not explained – in terms of nondynamic constituents. I specially strive (1) to frame both proposals against the backdrop of a venerable (...) Heraclitean metaphor and (2) to highlight the virtues of Experiential non‐Heracliteanism against its currently sexier Heraclitean counterpart. (shrink)

Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links between a spatio-temporal body and the self-ascribed properties or states. However, since P.F. Strawson’s influential attack, this view has been dismissed as a bad philosophical idea. The goal of this brief piece is to outline the body-ownership view and neutralise two classic (...) lines of objection against it: on the one hand, that the stance is incoherent; and, on the other, that it has counterintuitive implications. (shrink)

Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links between a spatio-temporal body and the self-ascribed properties or states. However, since P.F. Strawson’s influential attack, this view has been dismissed as a bad philosophical idea. The goal of this brief piece is to outline the body-ownership view and neutralise two classic (...) lines of objection against it: on the one hand, that the stance is incoherent; and, on the other, that it has counterintuitive implications. (shrink)

How should we think of perceptual experiences qua dynamic phenomena? Against an increasingly popular Heraclitean approach that frames them as irreducibly dynamic, the present book argues that perceptual experiences may be described in terms of non-dynamic categories, such as properties, relations, and states.

It is widely thought that, in his later work An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Bertrand Russell argued that our natural languages could in principle do away with indexicals. This brief piece, by contrast, aims to show that, instead of suggesting the potential eliminability of such expressions, Russell outlined a semantic account of indexicals according to which such expressions fundamentally depend on the perspectival way in which they refer to worldly items. If correct, this proposal would not only show that, (...) in Russell’s later work, the meaning of expressions like indexicals is not exhaustively determined by the items they refer to: it would also show that Russell did not mean to eliminate indexicals from our natural languages at all. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se hace una descripción de las variables fenomenológicas del movimiento, la ipseidad y la sensibilidad que propone la filosofía de Michel Henry. A partir de esta lectura se profundiza en el papel epistémico que ejerce la corporeidad, como horizonte de sentido para una ‘fenomenología de la vida material’.

De considerar los fundamentos metafísicos de disciplinas humanistas que andan en boga hoy día como la bioética o la ecofilosofía, se tendría que considerar las discusiones de fondo generadas en la modernidad por la filosofía de la naturaleza y la fenomenología material. Efectivamente, la genealogía de los dioses, la teogonía, la antropología y los dilemas éticos implicados en una especulación en torno al concepto de naturaleza, fueron tópicos adelantados por el Schelling en su libro Investigaciones filosóficas sobre la esencia de (...) la libertad humana y los objetos con ella relacionados. (shrink)

One of the minor works that has been immortalized and remains amongst the most cited essays in the history of philosophy courses is the 1874 publication entitled: An Answer to the Question: “What is Enlightenment”? by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. We propose an hermeneutics of the main topics and problems that Kant addresses in this fundamental text; in addition, we will connect its arguments with the thesis that will be supported in this work: namely, that modern philosophy is an (...) exercise of critical thinking that has implications on the educational views, as well as on the ethical and political bets that aim at finding solutions for a society that has been historically traversed by an armed conflict, in a complex scenario where economic crises and asymmetric and fratricidal confrontations have been used, in conventional and unconventional ways, to obtain political power. (shrink)

Being located in the horizon of the philosophical outrage, our article purpose is to show the phenomenological basis of Max Scheler’s anthropological proposal, whose immediate antecedents were Husserl’s researches regarding to the correlation man-world, the debate held between phenomenology and the incursion of psychology within the field of the objectives sciences, the develop of a growing up discipline such as physiology, and in general the gradual consolidation of evolutionary theories, which were taking from the philosophical anthropology his conceit of prevailing (...) discipline in the explanation of human phenomena. In the midst this theoretical chaos Scheler in The man’s place in the cosmos radicalize the thesis of I – world correlation of life, guiding the study of man closer to the eidetic transcendental pretention, and beyond the purely empirical description. According to this we understand that Scheler develops an anthropological proposal with a phenomenological nature. (shrink)

La historia de las ideas en Latinoamérica sigue siendo un campo fértil de indagaciones. Entre otras cosas porque en sus narraciones se ponen de manifiesto diversos proyectos de verdad. Uno de los propósitos que persigue este trabajo consiste en distinguir los principales tenores que han caracterizado a una interlocución plural y abierta de propuestas que gravitan alrededor de la pregunta de ¿cómo significar y construir una praxis sobre el pensamiento filosófico en Latinoamérica? En la marcha y al hilo de una (...) reconstrucción histórica de la problemática enunciada, se plantea que una de las propiedades que entrañan a este proyecto de filosofía es la pluralidad; se trata de una polifonía de voces que dialoga, diverge y polemiza con las corrientes filosóficas provenientes de las tradiciones europeas. (shrink)

Una de las novedades de la teoría mimética consiste en su mirada particular sobre el deseo humano y de sus despliegues en el campo de la literatura, asunto que ha sido materia de estudio por la filosofía, la antropología y la fenomenología. Buscamos a continuación explorar desde los insumos teóricos que se mencionan esbozar algunas ideas sobre la filosofía literaria y cómo estos mismo pueden ser brújula para orientar el lector en el estudio e interpretación de una obra literaria del (...) canon nacional: La Vorágine de José Eustasio Rivera. ¿En qué radica la novedad del planteamiento filosófico que se ha formulado en el presente ensayo? Básicamente en mostrar que la teoría mimética deriva en una filosofía literaria, que conecta con un análisis fenomenológico a propósito de cómo surge la violencia social a la luz de la expresión literaria. Para llevar a cabo dicho cometido, la propuesto se desglosa de la siguiente manera: en primer lugar, se propone una idea de lo que se entiende por filosofía literaria en relación con la apuesta del pensamiento de René Girard. Hecho esto, se procede a tematizar las relaciones entre fenomenología y teoría mimética en donde se profundiza en el análisis filosófico de los conceptos de la experiencia, el otro, la rivalidad, la vida y el deseo y la relación que guardan con la literatura. En un tercer momento, se propone el análisis filosófico que en clave mimética se aplica a la novela La Voràgine del escritor huilense José Eustasio Rivera. Finalmente, se propone en las conclusiones otros acercamientos a la teoría del deseo mimético y sus vínculos con el estudio filosófico de la literatura, de cara a la dialéctica del reconocimiento y sus intérpretes contemporáneos según la postura girardiana. (shrink)

En la historia como también en la tradición filosófica sobresale un ideal antropológico: no existe una única forma de definir la vida humana y su finalidad. Este ensayo busca demostrar la tesis que la humanidad es un concepto en disputa en la historia de la filosofía moderna y contemporánea. Esta historia pone de presente que pensar la idea de humanidad es un intento prometeico por reconocer la pluralidad de los proyectos de humanización, que desde los ámbitos sociales, religiosos, metafísicos, culturales, (...) sistémicos y éticos ponen de presente un diversidad compleja y siempre enriquecida de procesos de subjetivación y desubjetivación, que se enfrentan a los desafíos planteados por la caótica historia del siglo XX y la que nos asiste en este siglo XXI. (shrink)

¿“Quién asume la competencia en un caso para el cual no se ha previsto competencia alguna?”. Retomando esta pregunta de Carl Schmitt, el autor pretende unir la definición desgarradora de soberanía propuesta por este pensador con la idea de soberanía popular, consignada en las constituciones de los estados modernos y contemporáneos. El lector encontrará también una reflexión sobre la noción filosófica de estado de excepción y la ambivalencia entre peligro y oportunidad que este representa para el ejercicio del derecho y (...) de la política. (shrink)

Esta investigación determinó áreas críticas de interés en programas de ingeniería industrial para la incorporación de la gamificación en tres universidades de Colombia desde la percepción de estudiantes y docentes. Se evaluó la actualidad de los programas participantes y sus planes de estudio, lo que permitió identificar temas comunes entre las instituciones de educación mencionadas. Se aplicaron 125 encuestas, 109 a estudiantes (87,2%) y 16 a docentes (12,8%). Los docentes consideran de mayor complejidad temas del área de Investigación de Operaciones, (...) mientras que para los estudiantes corresponde principalmente a Producción. No se encontraron correlaciones significativas entre las tres universidades. (shrink)

Since the 1960s, scientists, engineers, and healthcare professionals have developed brain–computer interface (BCI) technologies, connecting the user’s brain activity to communication or motor devices. This new technology has also captured the imagination of publics, industry, and ethicists. Academic ethics has highlighted the ethical challenges of BCIs, although these conclusions often rely on speculative or conceptual methods rather than empirical evidence or public engagement. From a social science or empirical ethics perspective, this tendency could be considered problematic and even technocratic because (...) of its disconnect from publics. In response, our trinational survey (Germany, Canada, and Spain) reports public attitudes toward BCIs (N = 1,403) on ethical issues that were carefully derived from academic ethics literature. The results show moderately high levels of concern toward agent-related issues (e.g., changing the user’s self) and consequence-related issues (e.g., new forms of hacking). Both facets of concern were higher among respondents who reported as female or as religious, while education, age, own and peer disability, and country of residence were associated with either agent-related or consequence-related concerns. These findings provide a first look at BCI attitudes across three national contexts, suggesting that the language and content of academic BCI ethics may resonate with some publics and their values. (shrink)

El presente escrito pretende explicar la relevancia y actualidad ética del pensamiento personalista comunitario de Emmanuel Mounier contextualizándolo en medio de los desafíos del post-humanismo. De este modo, la exposición se centrará en un primer momento en el mundo actual y la “muerte del ser humano”, para luego detallar en qué consiste el post-humanismo y el personalismo comunitario. Finalmente, se confrontarán las ideas provenientes del post-humanismo con la propuesta de Mounier.

When analyzing food systems challenges, considering multiple different narratives might lead to solutions that are more innovative and grounded in the local context relative to considering just a single narrative. However, the relationship between narrative diversity and innovation in food systems is not fully understood. Understanding the structure of and interactions between different food systems narratives can help researchers to identify opportunities (e.g., policies, interventions, and institutions) that could facilitate food systems transformations. This paper explores how narratives about food systems (...) converge and vary between different groups of actors in rural Colombia as well as the implications for the co-development of innovative solutions amongst these actors to address food system challenges. As a case study, we focus on an important national policy initiative in Colombia, A Ciencia Cierta, which connects public science and civil society to implement community-based innovations. We conducted 47 interviews with key stakeholders, including policymakers, facilitators, academics, community leaders, and community participants who had been part of the initiative in Colombia, and experts about narratives in food systems globally. We found that actors (both individuals and groups) possess multiple narratives about food systems which evolve over time and adjust according to varying circumstances. Our findings indicate that hybrid innovations enabled by diverse knowledge(s) provide alternative solutions to overcome challenges faced by actors in food systems. This paper generates theoretical and empirical contributions to the growing study of how epistemic plurality can enhance innovation pathways in food systems. (shrink)

Psychological flexibility is a key concept of acceptation and commitment therapy. This factor has been linked with psychological wellbeing and associated factors, such as quality of life, in cancer patients. These and other positive results of acceptation and commitment therapy in cancer patients found in previous research could be enhanced by using mhealth tools. A three-arm randomized superiority clinical trial, with a pre-post-follow-up repeated measures intergroup design with a 1:1:1 allocation ratio is proposed. A hundred and twenty cancer patients will (...) be randomly assigned to one of the following interventions: face-to-face ACT + mobile application, face-to-face ACT, and Waitlist control group. The primary expected outcome is to observe significant improvements in psychological flexibility acceptance and action questionnaire- II in the face-to-face ACT + app group, after comparing baseline and post-treatment scores, and the scores will remain stable in the two assessment points, 3 and 6 months after the intervention. Secondary expected outcomes are significant increasing scores in quality of life and post-traumatic-growth, and significant decreasing scores in anxiety and depression, insomnia and fatigue at the same assessment points. Also, it is expected that the scores of this group will be higher than the scores of the face-to-face ACT group and the waitlist control group. This study aims to assess the efficacy of a combined intervention for psychological flexibility and associated symptoms in cancer patients. The results of this protocol may help to consider the use of acceptation and commitment therapy and mhealth applications in cancer settings as a valid therapeutic choice.Clinical Trial Registration[www.ClinicalTrials.gov], identifier [NCT05126823]. (shrink)

Este artículo inicia con una esquemática revisión de las ideas centrales del capítulo V “La dinámica del derecho” del libro Teoría Analítica del Derecho de Jorge Rodríguez, para luego cuestionar algunas afirmaciones que, a mi modo de ver, no siempre tienen una justificación evidente, explícita o satisfactoria. De esta manera, específicamente, el artículo se centra en: (i) mostrar cómo las propuestas de Rordríguez constituye un desarrollo adicional o sofisticación de los planteamientos formuladas por C. Alchourrón y E. Bulygin; (ii) evidenciar (...) cómo en sus aspectos generales esta sofisticación es adecuada y difícilmente refutable (aunque no imposible); y (iii) resaltar cómo algunas afirmaciones claves en el desarrollo del texto no siempre están acompañadas de una adecuada fundamentación. Por ello, si bien Jorge nos entrega su propia visión de la dinámica jurídica, la cual en trazos generales podemos compartir, en algunos detalles de la presentación se esconde alguien. Si es dios o el diablo quedará en manos de cada lector o lectora. (shrink)

A mediados del 2021 nos dimos cuenta de que, debido a la pandemia, el excelente libro Teoría Analítica del Derecho de Jorge L. Rodríguez, no había logrado el reconocimiento debido en la comunidad analítica del derecho. Para remediarlo, organizamos un Seminario de discusión de sus principales ideas. Esta sección especial que hoy presentamos en Isonomía cuenta con una selección de las contribuciones que reflexionan sobre diferentes capítulos del libro, y cierra con el artículo de Jorge L. Rodríguez revisando cuidadosamente sus (...) ideas en respuesta a las y los comentaristas. (shrink)

Al sur de la iglesia San Sebastián se perciben restos en los cuales se pueden ver dos baños islámicos. El baño de Suso apareció en el curso de excavaciones arqueológicas tras haber documentado unas tenerías de época posterior. En el baño de Yuso se han conservado tres salas abovedadas de medio cañón. Además, en la sala del poniente, identificada como sala caliente, está un arco de herradura, un ábside, y la traza de un arco geminado. El contacto entre la (...) caldera y la sala caliente se ha conservado bajo la forma de un arco de medio punto. En el baño de Suso se han conservado el hipocausto y las toberas. Estos dos baños tienen muchas similitudes. Nos revelan, por primera vez en Toledo, el modo de calefacción de la sala caliente. Hasta el momento, no son conocidos en los documentos medievales. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo examinaré las observaciones críticas que se presentan en este volumen a las ideas que he defendido en mi libro Teoría Analítica del Derecho (en adelante TAD). Carla Huerta Ochoa ha controvertido algunos puntos de mi enfoque sobre la caracterización del derecho. María Beatriz Arriagada, por su parte, ha formulado interesantes interrogantes sobre mi caracterización de las normas, la normatividad de las reglas constitutivas y mi reconstrucción de los conceptos jurídicos básicos. Mauricio Maldonado Muñoz ha refinado algunas (...) de mis observaciones sobre conflictos normativos y discutido algunos puntos sobre jerarquías normativas. Sebastián Agüero-San Juan ha relevado mi reconstrucción de la dinámica jurídica y puntualizado diferencias sobre el concepto de sistema dinámico, la operación de reforma de normas y el criterio de lex specialis. Finalmente, María Gabriela Scataglini ha planteado cuestionamientos a mi enfoque del dilema del seguimiento de reglas y la derrotabilidad del derecho. Trataré aquí de responder sus comentarios centrales. (shrink)

KRK ediciones publica la traducción al español del ya clásico texto de Andy Clark y David Chalmers 'La Mente Extendida' en su versión aparecida en la antología de textos Philosophy of Mind: classical and contemporary readings, editada por D. Chalmers en 2002 para Oxford University Press. La traducción va precedida de una interesante introducción al debate que surge a partir de la publicación original del texto en Analysis en 1998, a cargo de Ángel García Rodríguez y Francisco Calvo Garzón, quienes (...) son responsables también de la traducción del texto. -/- En La Mente Extendida Clark y Chalmers defienden la tesis de que los procesos cognitivos y mentales van más allá de los límites del cráneo y de la piel: hay elementos constitutivos de los procesos mentales y cognitivos más allá de los límites de nuestro propio cuerpo. Una tesis semejante había sido ya defendida por Putnam (1975) y Burge (1979); sin embargo, Clark y Chalmers distinguen ese tipo de externismo pasivo del externismo activo que ellos propugnan de acuerdo con el cual “las características externas relevantes son activas, desempeñado un papel crucial aquí y ahora. Como se hayan acopladas con el organismo humano, tienen un impacto directo sobre el organismo y su conducta” (La Mente Extendida p.67). -/- Carecería de sentido hablar en esta reseña de la relevancia de la tesis de la mente extendida y del debate que tanto en filosofía como en ciencia cognitiva ha suscitado―baste mencionar la multitud de artículos que se han escrito sobre La Mente Extendida, al punto que, de acuerdo con Google Scholars, es uno de los cien artículos filosóficos más citados.Por esta razón me centraré en la introducción al texto de García Rodríguez y Calvo Garzón. (shrink)

The article analyzes the four novels that Ángel García Ronda, politician and writer, has dedicated to ETA and to the situation experienced in the Basque Country as a result of terrorism. He is an important author for the knowledge of terrorism in literature, for the following reasons: his condition as born in San Sebastián in 1939, where he has lived all his life, the performance of positions in the Spanish Socialist Workers Party and in the Socialist Party from Euskadi, (...) having carried an escort for two decades, having suffered the murder of friends and acquaintances and, consequently, having extensive experience, public and private, of what happened in the Basque Country. We attend to the genesis, contents, intentionality and historicity of the tetralogy that the author has baptized as Áspera memoria. (shrink)

Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT or Google’s Bard have shown significant performance on a variety of text-based tasks, such as summarization, translation, and even the generation of new...

The debate between critics of syntactic and semantic approaches to the formalization of scientific theories has been going on for over 50 years. I structure the debate in light of a recent exchange between Hans Halvorson, Clark Glymour, and Bas van Fraassen and argue that the only remaining disagreement concerns the alleged difference in the dependence of syntactic and semantic approaches on languages of predicate logic. This difference turns out to be illusory.

Eva Schmidt argues that facts about incoherent beliefs can be non-evidential epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. In this commentary, I argue that incoherence-based reasons to suspend are epistemically superfluous: if the subjects in Schmidt’s cases ought to suspend judgment, then they should do so merely on the basis of their evidential reasons. This suggests a more general strategy to reduce the apparent normativity of coherence to the normativity of evidence. I conclude with some remarks on the independent interest that reasons-first (...) epistemology might have within an evidentialist framework. (shrink)

This paper elaborates on a theory of the ideological public sphere in the age of digital media. It describes the public sphere as an initially ascending and then descending communication process that includes both polarising and integrating publics, which are organised by antagonistic media and compromise-building mass media. This framework allows us to distinguish between hegemonic, populist, and popular-oriented flows of communication, as well as register changes in the interplay of different publics driven by digital media platforms. Digital transformations of (...) the public sphere give rise to antagonistic and networked-individualistic flows of populist communication that put public hegemony under constant pressure. The challenge is to find ways to strengthen popular communications that enable democratic learning processes and the flourishing of communicative competences of all citizens. (shrink)

I defend the Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl against a number of criticisms based on misconceptions. First, I dispute the claim that the Received View demands axiomatizations in first order logic, and the further claim that these axiomatizations must include axioms for the mathematics used in the scientific theories. Next, I contend that models are important according to the Received View. Finally, I argue against the claim that the Received View is intended to (...) make the concept of a theory more precise. Rather, it is meant as a generalizable framework for explicating specific theories. (shrink)

How would it be assessed from an ethical point of view if human wage work were replaced by artificially intelligent systems (AI) in the course of an automation process? An answer to this question has been discussed above all under the aspects of individual well-being and social justice. Although these perspectives are important, in this article, we approach the question from a different perspective: that of leading a meaningful life, as understood in analytical ethics on the basis of the so-called (...) meaning-in-life debate. Our thesis here is that a life without wage work loses specific sources of meaning, but can still be sufficiently meaningful in certain other ways. Our starting point is John Danaher’s claim that ubiquitous automation inevitably leads to an achievement gap. Although we share this diagnosis, we reject his provocative solution according to which game-like virtual realities could be an adequate substitute source of meaning. Subsequently, we outline our own systematic alternative which we regard as a decidedly humanistic perspective. It focuses both on different kinds of social work and on rather passive forms of being related to meaningful contents. Finally, we go into the limits and unresolved points of our argumentation as part of an outlook, but we also try to defend its fundamental persuasiveness against a potential objection. (shrink)

Carnap suggests that philosophy can be construed as being engaged solely in conceptual engineering. I argue that since many results of the sciences can be construed as stemming from conceptual engineering as well, Carnap’s account of philosophy can be methodologically naturalistic. This is also how he conceived of his account. That the sciences can be construed as relying heavily on conceptual engineering is supported by empirical investigations into scientific methodology, but also by a number of conceptual considerations. I present a (...) new conceptual consideration that generalizes Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for analytic–synthetic distinctions and thus widens the realm in which conceptual engineering can be used to choose analytic sentences. I apply these generalized conditions of adequacy to a recent analysis of scientific theories and defend the relevance of the analytic–synthetic distinction against criticisms by Quine, Demopoulos, and Papineau. (shrink)

This chapter argues that Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception should be understood, not as a theory of perception in the usual sense, but as belonging squarely to transcendental philosophy. Contra the interpretation of Phenomenology of Perception as essentially a work in the philosophy of psychology, and the associated naturalistic construal of his ideas, it is suggested that Merleau-Ponty must be seen in the light of the history of transcendental philosophy and that an original form of idealism lies at the heart of (...) his philosophical project. The transcendental turn is presupposed by Merleau-Ponty’s claims regarding perception, and his key notion of ambiguity is a transcendental descendant of Kant’s strategy of establishing idealism by way of antinomy. (shrink)

Departing from the claim that AI needs to be trustworthy, we find that ethical advice from an AI-powered algorithm is trusted even when its users know nothing about its training data and when they learn information about it that warrants distrust. We conducted online experiments where the subjects took the role of decision-makers who received advice from an algorithm on how to deal with an ethical dilemma. We manipulated the information about the algorithm and studied its influence. Our findings suggest (...) that AI is overtrusted rather than distrusted. We suggest digital literacy as a potential remedy to ensure the responsible use of AI. (shrink)

Syntactic approaches in the philosophy of science, which are based on formalizations in predicate logic, are often considered in principle inferior to semantic approaches, which are based on formalizations with the help of structures. To compare the two kinds of approach, I identify some ambiguities in common semantic accounts and explicate the concept of a structure in a way that avoids hidden references to a specific vocabulary. From there, I argue that contrary to common opinion (i) unintended models do not (...) pose a significant problem for syntactic approaches to scientific theories, (ii) syntactic approaches can be at least as language-independent as semantic ones, and (iii) in syntactic approaches, scientific theories can be as well connected to the world as in semantic ones. Based on these results, I argue that syntactic and semantic approaches fare equally well when it comes to (iv) ease of application, (v) accommodating the use of models in the sciences, and (vi) capturing the theory-observation relation. (shrink)

Geoffrey Hellman has argued that non-truth-functionality entails a change of meaning between classical and quantum logical connectives. This paper criticizes and significantly improves the argument.

Schelling’s 1809 Freiheitsschrift, perhaps his most widely read work, presents considerable difficulties of understanding. In this paper, I offer an interpretation of the work in relation to Kant. My focus is on the relation in each case of their theory of human freedom to their general metaphysics, a relation which both regard as essential. The argument of the paper is in sum that Schelling may be viewed as addressing and resolving a problem which faces Kant’s theory of freedom and transcendental (...) idealism, deriving from the challenge posed by Spinozism. One major innovation in Schelling’s theory of human freedom is his claim that it presupposes the reality of evil. I argue that Schelling’s thesis concerning evil also provides a key to the new and highly original metaphysics of the Freiheitsschrift. The relation of Schelling’s theory of freedom to his general metaphysics is therefore complex, for it goes in two directions: the metaphysics are not simply presupposed by the theory of freedom but are also in part derived from it. These new metaphysics also, I argue, allow Schelling to resolve a problem which his own earlier Spinozistic system had left unresolved. (shrink)

Kant's influence on the history of philosophy is vast and protean. The transcendental turn denotes one of its most important forms, defined by the notion that Kant's deepest insight should not be identified with any specific epistemological or metaphysical doctrine, but rather concerns the fundamental standpoint and terms of reference of philosophical enquiry. To take the transcendental turn is not to endorse any of Kant's specific teachings, but to accept that the Copernican revolution announced in the Preface of the Critique (...) of Pure Reason sets philosophy on a new footing and constitutes the proper starting point of philosophical reflection.In this volume a team of leading philosophers explore the concept of the transcendental as it developed through history, focusing on approaches to the transcendental project by Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Bernard Williams. By giving systematic shape to historical material, the volume provides a unique resource for systematic reflection on transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

Carnap’s search for a criterion of empirical significance is usually considered a failure. I argue that the results from two out of his three different approaches are at the very least problematic, but that one approach led to success. Carnap’s criterion of translatability into logical syntax is too vague to allow for definite results. His criteria for terms—introducibility by chains of reduction sentences and his criterion from “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”—are almost trivial and have no clear relation to (...) the empirical significance of sentences. However, his criteria for sentences—translatability, verifiability, falsifiability, confirmability—are usable, and under the assumptions needed for the Carnap sentence approach, verifiability, falsifiability, and translatability become equivalent. As a result of the Carnap sentence approach, metaphysics is rendered analytic. (shrink)

I argue that believing at will – i.e. believing for practical reasons – is in some sense possible and in some sense impossible. It is impossible insofar as we think of belief formation as a re-sult of our exercise of certain capacities (perception, memory, agency). But insofar as we think of belief formation as an action that might lead to such a result (i.e. a deliberation or an in-quiry), believing at will is possible. First I present and clarify the problem (...) and its philosophical relevance (section 1). I then argue that a belief formation as an immediate reaction to practical reasons is not necessarily equivalent to believing at will because the causal mechanism that leads to the formation might be deviant (section 2). Finally, I explain the difference between the two above mentioned meanings of “belief formation” in order to clarify the possibility and impossibility of believing at will (section 3). (shrink)

Animal models of human diseases are often used in biomedical research in place of human subjects. However, results obtained by animal models may fail to hold true for humans. One way of addressing this problem is to make animal models more similar to humans by placing human tissue into animal models, rendering them chimeric. Since technical and ethical limitations make neurological disorders difficult to study in humans, chimeric models with human neural tissue could help advance our understanding of neuropathophysiology. In (...) this article, we examine whether the introduction of human neural tissue and any consequent cognitive change is relevant to the way we ought to treat chimeras. We argue that changes in cognitive abilities are morally relevant to the extent that they increase the capacities that affect the moral status of any entity, including awareness, autonomy, and sociability. We posit that no being, regardless of species, should be treated in a way that is incommensurate with its moral status. Finally, we propose a framework that can be used to guide ethical assessment of research involving chimeras with advanced cognitive capacities. We advance this framework as a useful tool for bringing relevant considerations to the forefront for those considering the ethical merit of proposed chimeric research. In doing so, we examine concepts relevant to the question of how any entity may be treated, including moral status, dignity, and capacities. (shrink)